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Archive for the ‘IAEA’ Category

Parchin_7 (3-10-12)

In further distracting attention from Iran’s obligations as regards its nuclear program, the recent attempt by Herman Naeckerts and his IAEA team of negotiators to gain access to the Parchin military complex 30 km southeast of Tehran just failed again, as did previous enterprises in this regard. For obvious reasons, as Iran continues to describe the alleged evidence of that it had conducted illicit experiments with high explosives in a certain building on the vast complex a decade ago as fabricated as long as it has no chance to have a look at it. A further meeting has been  scheduled for February 12.

As a matter of fact, the respective site at Parchin with its two bigger buildings and a couple of garages or toolsheds had undergone considerable construction/renovation work since March 2012 (after years of no activity), and one small building had actually been demolished before May 25, 2012, as can be seen on GoogleEarth satellite images below (encircled).

Parchin_timeline

Iran’s agenda when drawing attention apparently by intention to the suspect site, which is right now under permanent scrutiny via satellite imaging, by obvious construction/renovation work (including hitting-the-eye covering the two main buildings with flashy pink tarpaulins) is not clear at all. No matter of whether illicit experiments with high explosives had been done before 2003, they might have been conducted elsewhere, at Parchin or, for instance, at the site at Marivan (which is close to the site where three American hikers had crossed the Iranian border with Iraq in June 2009 who had then been arrested by Iranian border patrols) which is also mentioned in the November 2011 report by IAEA DG Yukiya Amano. It is also possible that Iran does create ambiguity by purpose only to be relieved when nothing was found at the Parchin site after IAEA inspectors were eventually granted access.

Parchin_tunnel01

That conducting illict experiments with high explosives in a building (partly sealed off by an infamous berm) do not make too much sense was stressed yesterday by former IAEA director of nuclear inspections in Iraq, Robert Kelley. Tunnels would do better. There seems to be better locations at Parchin. Kelley exemplifies an area close to the main complex (encircled at the bottom of the satellite image), about 5 km southwest to the suspect building site (top).

Parchin_tunnel04

It consists of a number of buildings and apparently entrances for tunnels dug deep into the mountain. In spite of the possibility that Iran is still conducting experiments with high-explosives, it is, however, unlikely that before 2003 the site had been active. GoogleEarth provides timeline images which indicate that major tunnel construction activities only started after 2004 (in 2005, President Mahmoud Ajmadinejad, a downright tunnel expert by education, had been elected for the first time).

Parchin_tunnel02

Anyway, the ongoing Parchin charade about alleged experiments which have or have not  been conducted a decade ago has largely distracted attention and has quickly to be solved. Kelley suggests something new.

“What is needed is a new approach. The IAEA is stretching its mandate to the limit in asking for access to a military site based on tenuous evidence. The UN Security Council should step in and negotiate a visit to Parchin by a non-IAEA international team. That team could include experts with much greater experience than the IAEA can deploy and come to technical judgements about the site. If nothing nuclear is found then the IAEA has no grounds for complaint. If something nuclear is found then the IAEA will be vindicated and will need to become seriously engaged in the follow-up investigation.”

19 January 2013 @ 11:42 am.

Last modified January 19, 2013.

 

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Why has  the notorious November 27 graph published by George Jahn and Associated Press (AP), allegedly proving Iran’s possible military dimensions (PMD) of its nuclear program not been a hoax as several pundits have asserted in the meantime? Israel has been accused of having leaked, to the AP, stolen information about the IAEA’s own investigation of Iran’s nuclear PMD, which seems to be quite credible.

Now, David Albright, founder and president of Washington D.C.-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), had given a power point presentation (where? when?) explaining  why it probably was not. He couldn’t help since (as is obvious from his presentation) he was asked by AP (see slide 7/24).

“Just prior to the AP’s publication of the first article, I was asked to comment on the graphs by the AP (…). I have often assessed leaks to the media about the Iranian nuclear program and am skeptical about these leaks. I said that the explosive yield appeared too high to reflect an actual Iranian nuclear weapon design, assuming that such a design existed.

Upon learning after the publication of the error in the units, I analyzed the graph confirming the error but also I calculated that correct units were “joules per 10 nanoseconds” or “joules per shake.” A shake is a term from the Manhattan Project and refers to the short time frame between neutron generations in a nuclear explosion.

With those units, I estimated the area under the yield rate curve and derived an answer close to the total yield of about 50 kilotons (see two slides down).

The AP published my results in its second story along with a correction of its original claim.”

So, although Mr. Albright had been “skeptical about the leak[s]” as usual and had even noted “that the explosive yield appeared too high” the embarrassing graph was published. Only “[u]pon learning after the publication of the errors in the units”, he actually bothered to analyze the graphs in detail and, well, just confirmed what had been published by others so far. This is not very much credible.

On slide 9/24, Albright tries to make sense of the graph by calculating the area under the yield rate curve ending up with energy yield of “61 ktons” which is definitely not close to 50 kilotons as claimed on slide 7/24 and in the November 30 follow-up article by George Jahn. What follows in Albright’s power point presentation (“Subsequent Developments”, slides 10/24 through 19/24) is some further lofty speculation of what the Iranians had probably in mind when having produced this apparently nonsensical graph. This seems not to be his original research but the result of his consultation of Mark Gorwitz, an “ISIS consultant” and “world-class expert in open source nuclear technical literature”, whatever that may mean. However, Albright’s first judgment (when having been asked by George Jahn) was quite different, as Muhammad Sahimi, Professor of Chemical Engineering and Materials Science and the NIOC Chair in Petroleum Engineering at the University of Southern California, writes.

“As for Albright, according to Jahn he “said the diagram looks genuine but seems to be designed more ‘to understand the process’ than as part of a blueprint for an actual weapon in the making.” That is the level of understanding of the president of Institute for Science and International Security, which is essentially a mouthpiece for Yukiya Amano of the IAEA.” (My emphasis.)

So, what is actually Mr. Albright’s level of understanding, who holds an MSc in physics of Indiana University and  another in mathematics from Wright State University? Has he been “a former U.N. weapons inspector” as has been claimed whenever he had been asked by mainstream media about Iran’s allegedly illicit nuclear program? Definitely not. What appears time and again, though, is that Mr. Albright and his Institute for Science (sic!) and International Security pretend, when using obscure observations (be it from satellite images of, for instance, activities at the Parchin’ military complex or leaked, “by officials from a country critical of Iran’s atomic program”, and presumably faked, information), to prove what cannot be proved, namely that Iran is a nuclear threat to the world.

Amazingly, David Albright now seeks support from former Deputy Director General of the IAEA Ollie Heinonen, who writes (on slide 24/24), rather down-to-earth,

“Let us, however, look at facts. The graphs are just part of the information. We should not conclude too much from them. The graphs are part of a report. It would be good to know what is the actual content and text of that report, the scope of it, authors, etc. Then one can put such a report into its right context.

Then the report, including its contents, authors, and timing, has to be compared against other information, which is available (e.g. to the IAEA). This other information includes other reports, documents, publications, procurements, other individuals and known organizations, all of which give a broader picture of activities going on in Iran. Some of it is hard verifiable facts, and some of it is information which requires clarifications. The key question is then, does this information point in the direction of undeclared nuclear activities or non-peaceful use of nuclear energy? The IAEA conclusion has been for years that the information in its hands is sufficient to raise such questions with Iran, and ask them for clarifications. Some of the activities, perhaps even the graphs, can be explained by work to protect people, including in the military, from nuclear fall-out. But there are many items, such as the detonation experiments, work on neutron sources, the missile reentry vehicle, and uranium metallurgy, which do not serve radiological defense purposes.”

So, let us look at facts. Does leaking such a graph, which might even “be explained by work to protect people, including in the military, from nuclear fall-out” have a meaning other than misinforming and misleading the public by baseless speculation?

22 December 2012 @ 11:45 am.

Last modified December 22, 2012.

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Now as roofing two buildings at the Parchin military complex east of Tehran has nearly been completed, we get another chance of having a look from space thanks to David Albright’s Washington think tank ISIS who has kept us up to date. A lot has been achieved there since April when satellite pictures had indicated what resembled a vigorous spring cleaning using even quite a lot of water. After having removed now glaring pink tarps, the new roofs appear pleasantly blue. The area around the two buildings has been leveled and even some gardening seems to have taken place with piles of (garden?) mold neatly assembled probably for further beautification.

The problem is that one of the buildings has been identified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), indicated by its Director General Yukiya Amano in his November 2011 report, as having been constructed for illicit experiments with high-explosives in the early 2000s,

“49. Other information [...] provided by Member States indicates that Iran constructed a large explosives containment vessel in which to conduct hydrodynamic experiments. The explosives vessel, or chamber, is said to have been put in place at Parchin in 2000. A building was constructed at that time around a large cylindrical object at a location at the Parchin military complex. A large earth berm was subsequently constructed between the building containing the cylinder and a neighbouring building, indicating the probable use of high explosives in the chamber. The Agency has obtained commercial satellite images that are consistent with this information.”

Probably the same member state(s) which leaked the rather ridiculous graph the other day to Associated Press’ George Jahn which is supposed to prove Iran’s interest in computer simulations of nuclear test and which has been debunked by so many people in the meantime that I find it hard to write something halfway intelligent about it.

Parchin_4 (28-7-11)

Well, when having visited Parchin in 2005 twice, IAEA inspectors were not able to locate these rather peripheral two buildings (encircled at the top of the picture) inside this huge complex. Iran has not granted again access, which has been requested by the IAEA since Amano’s report, while work went on and ISIS reported regularly, not noticing that its founder and president David Albright made himself a laughing stock when asking IAEA’s DG and the Board of Governors the urgent question, “what should now be done about Iran’s continued refusal of a legitimate request for access combined with its alterations of the site?”

Indeed, what should be done? Does IAEA has a mandate to visit the site? Well, there seem to be different opinions about that. Would it help if Iran would provide access? If one actually assumes what Albright and others fear, what are the consequences of a visit? Supposed they have actually been conducted in the early 2000s (and, according to the 2007 NIE, abandoned in 2003), IAEA inspectors certainly would still find evidence for illicit experiments with high-explosives. Nuclear experiments cannot be undone just by cleaning buildings and removing and replacing soil. Even if they won’t find anything, with all these heavy construction work at the site in recent months Iran would not become a credible and responsible player overnight.

So, consequences are dire anyway. Unilateral sanctions, which are underway, will be a precursor for new UN sanctions and Iran’s pariah status cemented. And presidential elections are upcoming. Maybe both officials in the U.S. and Iran consider Nowruz as being a delightful occasion to officially show IAEA inspectors and the world the now tidied-up tool sheds. Until then, we have to wait for new satellite images provided by David Albright.

1 December 2012 @ 10:55 am

Last modified December 1, 2012.

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It has widely been reported that the head of Iran’s ‘s Atomic Energy Agency  Fereydoon Abbasi-Davani had, in an interview with the Arabian newspaper Al-Hayat the other day,  admitted that Iran had occasionally misinformed inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about its nuclear program because of foreign espionage.

Apparently as far as I can see he did not mention the IAEA, rather MI6, although one can be sure that Iran has been playing chess with IAEA’s Yukiya Amano and his predecessor Mohamed ElBaradei for a long time. But it makes certainly a difference what Abbasi-Davani had actually said and what is being spread through the media in times of mounting tensions about Iran’s nuclear program. “We sometimes [gave] false information in order to protect our nuclear sites and our earnings, as inevitably mislead foreign intelligence”. He predicts that “the [Iran's] file” will be referred again to the UN Security Council by Amano in November.

So, I was probably right when interpreting the recent covering of a suspect building at the Parchin military complex, which might contain or have contained a high explosive test chamber, with a flashy pink tarp which is highly visible from space as an attempt to mislead and mock both the IAEA and those who seem to be obsessed with these kinds of satellite images.

But both sides misinform. Respective David Albright, president and founder of Washington DC-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), who has been beating the drums about Parchin for almost eight years now, has a strange view of what Iran is allowed under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and what not. In his complaint about NAM (Non-aligned Movement) countries’ “hypocritical” statement on Iran’s nuclear program and the Tehran Declaration he claims that, under Article IV of the NPT, “Iran cannot claim the right to nuclear energy production – or a right to enrich at all – while under investigation for possible non-peaceful uses of these capabilities.” Not just hilarious but uninformed and misleading, as Dan Joyner of the Alabama School of Law rightfully debunks.

September 22, 2012 @ 09:16

Last update September 22, 2012.

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Update below.

Yukiya Amano, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has written another dangerous report on Iran’s  nuclear program. Again, the important news is that there is nothing new. His language becomes shrill, though. Non-diversion of “declared” nuclear material at the “declared” nuclear facilities and “locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used” is verified as before. But he seems to express doubt that Iran declares everything it is obliged to declare under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. The Fordow site near Qom has seen a doubling in (mainly not yet fed or spinning) centrifuges since his last report on Iran on May 25,  now they approximate 3000. But this time Amano also points, with increasing frustration and dismay, at the Parchin military site which had been mentioned in his November 2011 report as a site where Iran had possibly conducted illicit nuclear experiments with high explosives almost ten years ago and  which IAEA inspectors have not got permission by Iranian authorities, despite numerous requests, to visit yet. As seen on recent satellite images this site has been the subject of dramatic (de-)construction work since then. Amano stresses that, in stark contrast, nothing had changed in several years after the site (Parchin, but apparently different buildings of the huge complex) had been visited by the IAEA last time in 2005.

As an independently and cautiously acting nuclear watchdog, Amano has been a flop so far. Just a compliant US lackey. A diplomatic cable published by WikiLeaks has actually proved that some time ago. Whether Israel is really preparing for an attack before the US American election in November is still not certain. Dogs which bark, don’t bite. As a matter of fact Iran has been threatened with war at this time of the year for many years.

The best solution would be if Iran could finally grant access to the Parchin site and either prove nothing had happened at and in the suspect building or declare that illicit experiments there had been stopped after 2003.

An excellent rebuttal of Amano’s latest report can be found here.

August 31, 2012 @ 08:15

Last modified August 31, 2012.

Update. Once again, Moon of Alamaba discovered a significant detail in the two Amano reports on Iran, of May 25 and yesterday. One has to carefully read and calculate to understand that Iran has in fact reduced the amount of up to 20% enriched uranium-235 in the gaseous form UF6 (which can be further enriched to weapon-grade, 90% enriched, uranium)  from 101 kg (in the May 25 report) to 91.4 kg (in the report yesterday). Apparently Iran is now producing urgently needed (for medical purposes) fuel plates of UO2 for the Tehran Research Reactor which cannot be used for further enrichment, a confidence-building measure, so to say. It proves Amano’s dishonesty that he does not mention, let alone acknowledge, simple calculations but rather conceals them in numerous paragraphs and figures in the report.

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