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Archive for the ‘NPT’ Category

David Albright’s latest piece (with Robert Avagyan) on Parchin indicates that he has returned to his main interest (as was suggested by Professor Dan Joyner at the University of Alabama School of Law in a recent post on Arms Control Law).

Albright, founder and president of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), has been obsessed with this site for some seven years and his monitoring and reporting of satellite images of the site has attracted new interest even by IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano who cryptically answered “yes” when asked yesterday, by Reuters, “whether Iran was continuing to dismantle a site that is part of the Parchin complex, which U.N. inspectors can now only monitor via satellite imagery.” And furthermore, according to the same source, “They are undertaking quite intensive activities at Parchin.” Well, when reading the title of Albright and Avagyan’s piece, one may in fact fear that illicit high explosive tests are a current problem at Parchin (they are not), not something which has probably been conducted ten years ago.

Dan Joyner’s, well, uncouth  suggestion to Albright not to talk about business (international law) he is not an expert of but rather “stick to obsessing over satellite pictures of tarps at random military bases in Iran” aroused quite a comment storm on his blog, including a fierce rebuttal by Andrea Stricker, one of Albright’s few employees at ISIS, and Albright’s unfortunate rants, who even denounced Joyner’s expertise in NPT matters. There were quite a lot demands coming from what Albright later called Iranian regime “apologists” to substantiate his claims. Joyner himself was called by Albright “the Ayatollah’s lawer”, an unbelievable decompensation.

Well, Albright has a reputation of not being able to constructively respond to justified criticism of his agenda on Iran. His rants and threats in an interview with Sam Husseini and then and now his pathetic mentioning undoubted sex offenses committed by Scott Ritter, who had dared to deny that Albright has ever been a UN weapons inspector, when he criticizes one of Joyner’s “revealing” sources to “attack him” tells quite a lot about Albright’s apparent lack of any sense for academic disputes. When it comes to war and peace, it’s all about evidence, not speculation; something which non-academics may have problems to comprehend.

I have written about Albright’s questionable (as they are not peer-reviewed) and even dangerous analyses about Iran’s nuclear program before, then quoting two highly recommended pieces, one by  Scott Kemp and Alexander Glaser at Princeton and another Professor Muhammad Sahimi at Stanford published at antiwar.com. Sahimi recalled this piece yesterday at Joyner’s blog, and, what has now to be expected, how Albright responded to it then.

18 October 2012 @ 7:52 am

Last modified October 18, 2012.

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It has widely been reported that the head of Iran’s ‘s Atomic Energy Agency  Fereydoon Abbasi-Davani had, in an interview with the Arabian newspaper Al-Hayat the other day,  admitted that Iran had occasionally misinformed inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about its nuclear program because of foreign espionage.

Apparently as far as I can see he did not mention the IAEA, rather MI6, although one can be sure that Iran has been playing chess with IAEA’s Yukiya Amano and his predecessor Mohamed ElBaradei for a long time. But it makes certainly a difference what Abbasi-Davani had actually said and what is being spread through the media in times of mounting tensions about Iran’s nuclear program. “We sometimes [gave] false information in order to protect our nuclear sites and our earnings, as inevitably mislead foreign intelligence”. He predicts that “the [Iran's] file” will be referred again to the UN Security Council by Amano in November.

So, I was probably right when interpreting the recent covering of a suspect building at the Parchin military complex, which might contain or have contained a high explosive test chamber, with a flashy pink tarp which is highly visible from space as an attempt to mislead and mock both the IAEA and those who seem to be obsessed with these kinds of satellite images.

But both sides misinform. Respective David Albright, president and founder of Washington DC-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), who has been beating the drums about Parchin for almost eight years now, has a strange view of what Iran is allowed under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and what not. In his complaint about NAM (Non-aligned Movement) countries’ “hypocritical” statement on Iran’s nuclear program and the Tehran Declaration he claims that, under Article IV of the NPT, “Iran cannot claim the right to nuclear energy production – or a right to enrich at all – while under investigation for possible non-peaceful uses of these capabilities.” Not just hilarious but uninformed and misleading, as Dan Joyner of the Alabama School of Law rightfully debunks.

September 22, 2012 @ 09:16

Last update September 22, 2012.

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Updated below (July 4, 6)

New satellite imagery of a suspect site at Parchin military complex in Iran, 30 km east of Tehran have been published yesterday by David Albright and Robert Avagyan of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS). The June 7 picture shows further heavy activity including anew flow of water from the main building and moved soil all of which had been interpreted as cleansing and sanitizing  a site where Iran had allegedly conducted illicit nuclear experiments including high explosive tests, at least a decade ago. While two smaller building close to the main building have been destroyed as was seen on May 25 pictures, nuclear engineer Robert Kelley and former director at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has pointed to the fact (on Jeffrey Lewis’ ArmsControlWonk) that the suspect main building itself was still intact. It seems quite reasonable to conclude,

“The Director General of the IAEA is reinforcing claims of the US member of the IAEA Board of Governors that the Parchin site is being sanitized, when it is clear that only one area outside the boundaries of that site may be in the process of being cleared for unknown purposes.  The area next to the test building, where any random uranium contamination might have occurred and is the area that would need sanitizations remains untouched.  The alleged suspicious activity is outside the fence, and in some cases is probably not even occurring.  When trees and features up to 12 years old have not been disturbed it is incredible to say they are being sanitized.

Iran should be asked to explain why they are leveling a field outside the boundaries of a non-nuclear site not subject to IAEA inspections.  They may choose not to answer.  The Director General should be asked to explain why he characterizes minor landscaping activities outside the boundaries of a site that troubles him, as sanitization and worrying.  He too may not choose to answer.”

Comments to his opinion by him, David Albright and others are informative, too.

In prospect of the failed Moscow Talks of E3+3 of June 18 and 19, Gareth Porter of Inter Press Service had suggested that any highly visible activities at a such scrutinized site (which anyway would not remove easily traceable amounts of nuclear material) would make sense for Iran only if it could prove without doubt that nothing illicit has ever been done there if and when IAEA inspectors are eventually allowed to visit the site. “The only thing missing is somebody waving to the satellite,” he quotes nuclear scientist Dr. Behrad Nakhai.

Well, sort of red herring. Porter writes,

“The nature of the changes depicted in the images [of May 8 and 30] and the circumstances surrounding them suggest, however, that Iran made them to gain leverage in its negotiations with the IAEA rather than to hide past nuclear experiments. “

But this has apparently not happened. When IAEA can inspect the site is, after Moscow, unclear.

June 21, 2012 @ 6:57

Update July 4, 2012. ISIS has published the other day new satellite imagery of June 21 indicating what David Albright and Robert Avagyan consider progress of “suspected activity at the Parchin site,” lots of bulldozing, again water flow, etc. The suspect main building seems to be still intact, though. Environmental samples eventually taken by IAEA inspectors would probably not be affected. Even Iranians know that.

Update July 6, 2012. And here Gareth Porter’s new account debunking the whole tale of the Parchin site.

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Two demolished smaller buildings at the suspect site and huge amounts of earth which had apparently been (re)moved in the vicinity certainly won’t contribute to urgently desired confidence building that Iran is not doing illicit experiments at the Parchin military complex some 30 km east of Tehran. While an April 9 satellite picture apparently showing water running from the building has led to humorous speculations by some over possible spring cleaning (rather than raised eyebrows) the new image of May 25, just after IAEA’s Yukiya Amano had returned to Vienna after discussions in Tehran about IAEA inspectors being finally allowed to visit Parchin need in fact explanation by Iran.

Last modified June 1, 2012.

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That the two-day meeting of E3+3 with an Iranian delegation in Baghdad over the latter’s nuclear program has de facto been adjourned to be continued in Moscow on June 18 is probably the only outcome which may prevent the whole endeavor of being a complete failure. Sanctions were not to be removed off the table (or even softened), but why should Iran then give in stopping further enriching uranium?

In an uncommon move the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Director General Yukiya Amano was sent had arrived just hours before the Baghdad meeting in Tehran to negotiate a deal which would IAEA inspectors grant an easier access to suspicious facilities, most probably including that at Parchin which had been identified of having been the place of experiments with high-explosives a decade ago. Iran had signaled cooperation and willingness to sign a respective agreement (just an additional protocol to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, Iran is a signatory of since 1968). What else could be expected? Iran had done so already in 2003 (but never ratified it by its parliament) and only abandoned it in 2006 when facing several rounds of UNSC sanctions.

The upcoming report by Amano might shed light on what has actually been agreed upon and when Parchin and the respective building allegedly containing the high-explosive test chamber, which might have been cleansed in the meantime, can be visited. What IAEA inspectors are so keen to see there is, after all, unclear. ArmsControlWonk’s Jeffrey Lewis had yesterday debunked the hype in the West about the building which might have been the site of, illicit or not, experiments in the early 2000s. High-explosive test chambers just look different than the ominous computer-generated drawing which has been circulating for some time now and which only reminds us of similar disingenuous attempts by W. G. Bush’s Secretary of State Colin Powell when he tried to convince the public about the immediate threat of Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction nine years ago.

The likelihood that a highly desired agreement between the IAEA and Iran is actually signed within the next coming days is, after next-to-nothing results of the Baghdad meeting, pretty small.

Last modified May 25, 2012.

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