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Posts Tagged ‘NPT’

Parchin_7 (3-10-12)

In further distracting attention from Iran’s obligations as regards its nuclear program, the recent attempt by Herman Naeckerts and his IAEA team of negotiators to gain access to the Parchin military complex 30 km southeast of Tehran just failed again, as did previous enterprises in this regard. For obvious reasons, as Iran continues to describe the alleged evidence of that it had conducted illicit experiments with high explosives in a certain building on the vast complex a decade ago as fabricated as long as it has no chance to have a look at it. A further meeting has been  scheduled for February 12.

As a matter of fact, the respective site at Parchin with its two bigger buildings and a couple of garages or toolsheds had undergone considerable construction/renovation work since March 2012 (after years of no activity), and one small building had actually been demolished before May 25, 2012, as can be seen on GoogleEarth satellite images below (encircled).

Parchin_timeline

Iran’s agenda when drawing attention apparently by intention to the suspect site, which is right now under permanent scrutiny via satellite imaging, by obvious construction/renovation work (including hitting-the-eye covering the two main buildings with flashy pink tarpaulins) is not clear at all. No matter of whether illicit experiments with high explosives had been done before 2003, they might have been conducted elsewhere, at Parchin or, for instance, at the site at Marivan (which is close to the site where three American hikers had crossed the Iranian border with Iraq in June 2009 who had then been arrested by Iranian border patrols) which is also mentioned in the November 2011 report by IAEA DG Yukiya Amano. It is also possible that Iran does create ambiguity by purpose only to be relieved when nothing was found at the Parchin site after IAEA inspectors were eventually granted access.

Parchin_tunnel01

That conducting illict experiments with high explosives in a building (partly sealed off by an infamous berm) do not make too much sense was stressed yesterday by former IAEA director of nuclear inspections in Iraq, Robert Kelley. Tunnels would do better. There seems to be better locations at Parchin. Kelley exemplifies an area close to the main complex (encircled at the bottom of the satellite image), about 5 km southwest to the suspect building site (top).

Parchin_tunnel04

It consists of a number of buildings and apparently entrances for tunnels dug deep into the mountain. In spite of the possibility that Iran is still conducting experiments with high-explosives, it is, however, unlikely that before 2003 the site had been active. GoogleEarth provides timeline images which indicate that major tunnel construction activities only started after 2004 (in 2005, President Mahmoud Ajmadinejad, a downright tunnel expert by education, had been elected for the first time).

Parchin_tunnel02

Anyway, the ongoing Parchin charade about alleged experiments which have or have not  been conducted a decade ago has largely distracted attention and has quickly to be solved. Kelley suggests something new.

“What is needed is a new approach. The IAEA is stretching its mandate to the limit in asking for access to a military site based on tenuous evidence. The UN Security Council should step in and negotiate a visit to Parchin by a non-IAEA international team. That team could include experts with much greater experience than the IAEA can deploy and come to technical judgements about the site. If nothing nuclear is found then the IAEA has no grounds for complaint. If something nuclear is found then the IAEA will be vindicated and will need to become seriously engaged in the follow-up investigation.”

19 January 2013 @ 11:42 am.

Last modified January 19, 2013.

 

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Well, what’s missing in the latest satellite image of the “suspected high explosives test building” at the military site Parchin east of Tehran is actually a nice bow. The building, now covered with pink material, definitely looks like a gift box for the IAEA and interested western think tanks such as David Albright’s Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS).

Why the main building, in which about ten years ago experiments had allegedly been conducted in a high explosives test chamber (see a picture of a real chamber here) as part of Iran’s then apparently military nuclear program, has now been covered by a flashy plastic foil remains a mystery. What activities do the Iranians want to hide there while everybody is watching?

David Albright’s advice to the IAEA that

“unless Iran demonstrates concretely that it is willing to address these issues [Iran’s refusal of access to the Parchin site and its refusal to discuss any other evidence of weaponization work], the Board should pass a resolution that refers this set of issues to the U.N. Security Council for further action, including the imposition of additional sanctions”

must actually be considered a further exaggeration of his now entirely absurd charade.

Let’s see whether the Iranians will finally grant access to Parchin and what IAEA inspectors will find. If nothing, well, in that case Albright might be wrong when still pretending that the site had been sanitized. He knows (or should know) best that natural or depleted uranium as a substitute for fissile materials cannot be just washed away.

August 24, 2012 @ 19:32

Last update August 24, 2012.

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When Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel claimed in March 2008 to the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, that the protection of Israel’s right to exist is part of Germany’s raison d’état (“Die[se] historische Verantwortung Deutschlands ist Teil der Staatsräson meines Landes. Das heißt, die Sicherheit Israels ist für mich als deutsche Bundeskanzlerin niemals verhandelbar”)  it wasn’t very clear how far she actually wanted to go when mentioning Iran, again, and its claimed nuclear weapons program as imminent threat for Israel. The context was the Shoah and Germany’s historic shame. Another knee-jerk genuflection, inevitable for any honorable German visiting Germany’s eternal victims. (It is interesting to learn that her controversial remark of Israel’s right to exist being Germany’s reason of state cannot be found on her personal webpage).

When recently visiting Israel, new Federal President Joachim Gauck was somewhat more precise when cautioning Israel against war with Iran.

Well, when in May 2012 Germany sold several Dolphin-class submarines to Israel, it was already speculated that they can and would in fact carry nukes.  Der Spiegel has it today that Israel in fact deploys nuclear weapons on these submarines. Former State Secretary Lothar Rühl and former chief of the planning staff Hans Rühle, have told the magazine that “they had always assumed that Israel would deploy nuclear weapons on the submarines. Rühl had even discussed the issue with the military in Tel Aviv.”

Israel, not a member of the Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty, does not comment officially on its nuclear weapons program. The German government has knowledge about it since 1961, though. According to Der Spiegel,

“Merkel had tied the delivery of the sixth submarine to a number of conditions, including a demand that Israel stop its expansionist settlement policy and allow the completion of a sewage treatment plant in the Gaza Strip, which is partially financed with German money. So far, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has met none of the terms.”

Last modified June 7, 2012.

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Apart from now common and frequent reference to Iran being in contrary to UN Security Council resolutions, the latest Iran report of UN nuclear watchdog Yukiya Amano does not state anything new except that environmental samples taken at the Fordow uranium enrichment site have revealed a level of enriched uranium above what has Iran has declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 27%.

“28. The results of analysis of environmental samples taken at FFEP (Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant on 15 February 2012 showed presence of particles with enrichment levels of up to 27% U-235, which are higher than the level stated in the DIQ (Design Information Questionnaire). In a letter dated 4 May 2012, the Agency (IAEA) requested that Iran provide an explanation for the presence of these particles. In its reply, dated 9 May 2012, Iran indicated that the production of such particles “above the target value” may happen for technical reasons beyond the operator’s control. The Agency is assessing Iran’s explanation and has requested further details. On 5 May 2012, the Agency took further environmental samples from the same location where the particles in question had been found. These samples are currently being analysed.”

David Albright, president of the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), has an explanation and both dampens and fuels the immediate brouhaha in mainstream media.

“The IAEA has found traces of uranium enriched up to 27 percent at Iran’s Fordow enrichment plant. This elevation is likely due to improved cascade design. An effect is to overshoot 20 percent when 3.5 percent LEU (low enriched uranium) is fed into the tandem cascades at the old feed rate for 15 stage cascades. To avoid this problem, Iran likely increased the feed rate of 3.5 percent LEU, which lowered the enrichment level of the product back to 19.75 percent. It also increased slightly the amount of 19.75 percent produced.

This development is an embarrassment for Iran but it is not a sign of Iran moving to higher enrichment levels. Nonetheless, its deployment of a 17-stage cascade reflects a reconfiguration of the cascades that can make breakout faster and more efficient.” (Emphasis added.)

Well, 19.75% is a construct anyway. It is conventionally LEU while 20+ percent would be highly enriched uranium (which automatically would lead to brouhaha).  That the Iranians are embarrassed is rather not likely. That IAEA inspectors were able to detect these “particles” indicates just two things: That Iran can quickly enrich to higher levels if a respective decision was made and that the IAEA can easily monitor this (provided Iran has made them aware of each of its enrichment facilities; Amano again complains that Iran has specified, in 2010, the locations of ten further sites without providing the IAEA with respective information yet).

 

Last modified May 26, 2012.

 

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David Albright and Paul Brannan of the Washington based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) have allegedly identified, on commercial satellite imagery, a building that inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) wanted to visit on February 21 but were denied access by Iranian delegates. The building, so Albright and Brannan, contains or used to contain the high-explosive test chamber mentioned in IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano’s November 2011 report on Iran’s nuclear program. Amano didn’t want to rule out that Iran may be trying to remove evidence from the military site (Parchin).  “We have information that some activity is ongoing there,” Amano said on Friday last week.

The imagery on ISIS’ webpage is unimpressive. So is GoogleEarth imagery from 28 July 2011. The building (at the top of the image above), allegedly containing or having contained the high-explosive test chamber (tests have allegedly been done, according to IAEA “member states” as referred to in Amano’s November 2011 Annex to his Iran report, in the early 2000s) is more than 4 km away from other high-explosive facilities (at the bottom) IAEA inspectors had visited twice in 2005 without any result.

Last modified March 14, 2012.

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