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Posts Tagged ‘Qom’

The new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s nuclear program is out and it seems to conclude that “Iran’s leaders are locked in an increasingly heated debate over whether to move further toward developing nuclear weapons, saying the bite of international sanctions may be sowing discord,” as the Wall Street Journal tells. Given the simple fact that the publication of parts of the 2007 NIE has prevented another war in the Middle East it is very bad news that there will be no declassified version of the estimate this time. Anyway, the 2007 NIE which has concluded that Iran has halted its military nuclear program in 2003 (“with high confidence”) and which has aroused considerable dismay of former U.S. President G. W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney is now obsolete.

That Iran had tried to build a secret uranium enrichment facility at Fordow near Qom which has been revealed in 2009 can apparently been considered as proof that Iran pursues a nuclear weapon, House Foreign Affairs ranking Democrat Howard Berman told The Cable at Foreign Policy, a remarkably uninformed estimate. The Fordow site had been declared by Iranian officials according to Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations way before being ready for operation. It’s just about Iran not having signed and ratified the Additional Protocol of the treaty.

That Iran lost its interest in the site after it had been revealed is, of course, another story.

Last modified February 17, 2011.

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When last year, at the G-20 summit in Pittsburgh, President Obama, former Prime Minister Gordon Brown and President Sarkozy made public a secret uranium enrichment site at Fordow near Qom in Iran, one week after the Iranians had informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about the construction site in a letter, the international shock was immense. Although former IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei described the site later as just “a hole in the mountain” after a visit in October, suspicion grew that Iran may pursue the covert construction of possibly numerous sites in the country without informing the Agency, apparently in response to continuous threats of military actions from Israel and the United States. Tehran apparently even lost interest in the Fordow site after it had been revealed. In November, Ali Akbar Salehi, head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Agency, had announced that the country is investigation the suitability for uranium enrichment of ten further sites in Iran.

Yesterday the National Council for the Resistance of Iran (NCRI), which is related to the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MKO, a terrorist organization according to the US, UK and Iran), and which has also revealed the existence of Iran’s first uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, has claimed that another secret enrichment site in Abyek near Qazvin, northwest of the capital Tehran,  had been under construction for at least five years. Satellite imagery of GoogleEarth (figures a and b, before 2004) and material of August 2010 provided by DigitalGlobe (figures c and d) indicate considerable activity with several tunnel entrances. In fact, at first sight, the new pictures resemble those of the Fordow site.

David Albright of the non-governmental Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) has questioned in the meantime the claim made by the NCRI. Of course, Salehi has denied the allegations, as well. As state owned Press TV reports, he mentions other activities, such as the construction of “plenty of facilities that, for example, sterilize agricultural products [by] using nuclear technology which do not fall into the nuclear plant category,” which might not be very convincing.

The coming days will show whether the reported digging activities have any meaning with regard to Iran’s allegedly military/peaceful nuclear program.

 

Last update September 11, 2010.

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The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Yukiya Amano’s new Iran report contains certain remarkable parts which might deserve some analysis.

To begin, there is nothing substantially new to report about Iran’s efforts to enrich uranium to low levels of 3 to 4% (LEU) at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) and to just below 20% at the Pilot FEP, both at Natanz; construction work at the second enrichment site in Fordow, which seems to have slowed down (most probably because the Iranians lost interest in the site after its existence had had been disclosed by President Obama at the G20 summit in Pittsburgh last September); the heavy water reactor in Arak; or the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. As of August 6, Iran has produced some 2,800 kg low enriched-uranium (LEU) at 3.5% and 22 kg LEU at just below 20%.

It is more interesting to read, in paragraph 35, that Amano had received a letter from Iran on 3 June 2010 stating that the designation of relevant inspectors of the IAEA will be withdrawn if confidential information acquired by the Agency as a result of implementing its Safeguard Agreement “leaks, in any way, and/or is conveyed to the media” (emphasis added). In another letter only one week later, Amano was informed that the designation of two inspectors, who had recently conducted inspections in Iran, has been objected, referring to the “false and wrong statements in paragraph 28” of Amano’s previous report. I had commented on that issue when having analyzed Amano’s last Iran report:

“In addition, in contrast to his predecessor, Amano does not seem to exercise due care in his report. He reports, for instance,

‘28. On 9 January 2010, during a DIV (Design Inventory Verification) at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory (JHL) in Tehran, the Agency was informed by the operator that pyroprocessing R&D activities had been initiated at JHL to study the electrochemical production of uranium metal. On 14 April 2010, the Agency conducted another DIV at the JHL, during which Iran reiterated what it had stated in its letter dated 21 February 2010, specifically that the activities were related to ‘a research project aiming purely [at] studying the electrochemical behavior or uranyl ion in ionic liquid,’ using a uranyl nitrate solution. During the latter DIV, the Agency observed that the electrochemical cell had been removed.’ Supposedly, these activities should be seen in relation to Iran’s efforts to produce fuel rods or plates for the TRR.

Doubt is spread here by Amano since metal uranium might be used for both military and civilian purposes. According to Soltanieh, ‘nothing has been removed. Whatever that is in the paragraph is wrong.’ According to Reuters, ‘an official with knowledge of the Iran investigation said the missing part was the ‘outer vessel’ of the equipment and that the main section had been left in place.’”

Withdrawals of Agency inspector designations have occurred also in the past. Amano insists that the reporting of the two recently barred inspectors was accurate. But why wasn’t it possible to simply check whether Soltanieh’s explanation regarding the observation made by the two inspectors was correct? The Agency also requested that Iran reconsiders “its decision of 16 January 2007 to request the Agency to withdraw the designation of 38 Agency inspectors and its requests (dating back to 2006) to withdraw the designations of four other inspectors with experience in conducting inspections in Iran.” David Sanger wrote yesterday in the New York Times, citing a European diplomat under the condition of anonymity: “Iran’s actions … are slowly blinding the agency and undermining its ability to conduct inspections with the kind of freedom it needs to dig beneath official denials and disavowals.” But how can Iran act in a different way if Amano wouldn’t even consider Soltanieh’s explanation?

Time and again, IAEA reports on Iran have demanded full implementation of the Additional Protocol as a confidence-building measure and the implementation of the modified Code 3.1 on the early provision of design information. In fact, if Iran’s leaders could agree to ratify what had been signed before, many problems with the country’s nuclear program could indeed be solved.

However, time and again American presidents have also confirmed that ‘all options were on the table,’ meaning military action aiming in the destruction of any nuclear facility; measures aiming in regime change, including the covert support of groups with a terroristic background; and, of course, ‘crippling’ sanctions. Israel deliberates military attacks, too. The public has been prepared well in recent years for another upcoming war in the Middle East.

Confidence building is overdue on both sides. Amano should take that into account when drafting his next reports on Iran.

 

Last update September 7, 2010.

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Not even as an example of bad journalism, the rather warmongering piece by Jeffrey Goldberg in The Atlantic last week isn’t really worth of reading through all its fifteen printed pages. That there had been or will be a Point of No Return, as its title suggests, essentially remains obscure. There will be no support for Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s presumed desires or plans of bombing Iran by the Obama Administration. That, as Goldberg seems to forecast, “one day next spring, the Israeli national-security adviser, Uzi Arad, and the Israeli defense minister, Ehud Barak, will simultaneously telephone their counterparts at the White House and the Pentagon, to inform them that their prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has just ordered roughly one hundred F-15Es, F-16Is, F-16Cs, and other aircraft of the Israeli air force to fly east toward Iran – possibly by crossing Saudi Arabia, possibly by threading the border between Syria and Turkey, and possibly by traveling directly through Iraq’s airspace, though it is crowded with American aircraft,” is  a scenario, or screenplay, outlined by others for some time but nevertheless remains mainly fantasy. It’s not going to happen.

When painting his fantasy in glowing colors, predicting,

“[I]n these conversations, which will be fraught, the Israelis will tell their American counterparts that they are taking this drastic step because a nuclear Iran poses the gravest threat since Hitler to the physical survival of the Jewish people. The Israelis will also state that they believe they have a reasonable chance of delaying the Iranian nuclear program for at least three to five years. They will tell their American colleagues that Israel was left with no choice. They will not be asking for permission, because it will be too late to ask for permission,”

and declaring it as more likely than anything else, then Goldberg is clearly on the wrong track. Even after having talked to “roughly 40 current and past Israeli decision makers (many of them had only spoken to him on condition of anonymity, though) about a military strike, as well as many American and Arab officials,” who gave him the impression that “there is a better (!) than 50 percent chance (!) that Israel will launch a strike by next July,” it is supposedly Goldberg’s wishful thinking. Gareth Porter has made it clear that senior Israeli officials have long opposed such a strike. Even Goldberg had noted that Admiral Mullen had “recently made a stop in Israel that had one main purpose, according to an Israeli source: ‘to make sure we didn’t do anything in Iran before they thought we might do something in Iran.’”

Well, Goldberg is only one of numerous neocon commentators who like to mix up facts with myths. A nuclear Iran, which is “unacceptable” to Obama is certainly another country with nuclear weapons. “Going nuclear” is a highly ambiguous term, as Joshua Pollack explains in his sober piece on armscontrolwonk.com. The well-known fact that, with considerable technical problems, Iran enriches uranium at the low level of 3.5 to 4 percent for the purpose of generating, in the future, electricity (and, since Western powers have so far denied to provide Iran with higher-enriched uranium for its research reactor in Tehran, just below 20% for medical purposes) is obscured with a ‘nuclear threat’ by a weapons program which Iran has always claimed not to pursue.

It may be all about the largely delayed update of the once peace-saving National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran of November 2007, a Memorandum of Holders, which has not been finalized yet. Not updated most probably due to lack of intelligence which would make a revision of the previous NIE’s basic conclusions mandatory, namely that, with moderate-to-high confidence, Iran has not made a decision to resume its nuclear weapons program since fall 2003, which, with high confidence, it had had then.

Goldberg cites Israel’s defense minister, Ehud Barak, to whom “[T]he real threat to Zionism is the dilution of quality.“

“Jews know that they can land on their feet in any corner of the world. The real test for us is to make Israel such an attractive place, such a cutting-edge place in human society, education, culture, science, quality of life, that even American Jewish young people want to come here.”

According to Barak, this vision is threatened by Iran and its proxies. The vision is shared by former deputy defense minister Ephraim Sneh, “one leading proponent of an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities,” who “is convinced that if Iran crossed the nuclear threshold (?) the very idea of Israel would be endangered:

“These people are good citizens, and brave citizens, but the dynamics of life are such that if someone has a scholarship for two years at an American university and the university offers him a third year, the parents will say, ‘Go ahead, remain there.’

“If someone finishes a PhD and they are offered a job in America, they might stay there. It will not be that people are running to the airport, but slowly, slowly, the decision-making on the family level will be in favor of thaying abroad. The bottom line is that we would have an accelerated brain drain. And an Israel that is not based on entrepreneurship, that is not based on excellence, will not be the Israel of today.”  

But what about the vision of Palestinians who are living in occupied territories? And is it actually Iran which makes living in Israel hardly attractive for reasonable people right now? Or is it rather Israel’s largely irrational politics with new settlements in East Jerusalem, the 2006 war in Lebanon and that in 2008/09 in Gaza? Has a country committing paranoid acts such as the Gaza aid flotilla attack in May, seen by many as a war crime state terrorism, really a future? And would it get more security by attacking Iran’s nuclear sites with hundreds of fighter jets, setting the Middle East once more on fire?

Another solution the diplomatically largely discredited Obama administration may consider was offered by Joshua Pollock: Careful intelligence and openly revealing knowledge about the covert Qom/Fordow enrichment site last year in a press conference on the occasion of the G20 summit in Pittsburgh has effectively shut down any activities there. Yes, “it’s intelligence, in the plain sense of the word.” Remember, the Fordow site was, according to Iranian officials, part of a contingency plan after continuous threats by Israel and the Bush/Cheney administration of attacking the enrichment site at Natanz in 2007. Any plans for military attacks were more or less abandoned after the NIE in November that year. It had been speculated that the defected nuclear scientists Shahram Amiri, who might have been a double agent, had revealed the site.

So, as we know, everything is interconnected.

 

Note: The picture shows two Israeli F-15s bombers over Auschwitz. The Polish government had invited the Israeli Air Force to make this highly symbolic flight. Goldberg mentions that he has seen numerous of these photographs in Israeli offices. Despite Ahmadinejad’s Holocaust denial and frequent foretelling that Israel will vanish from history, to draw a comparison between the extermination of European Jews during WWII in Nazi Germany and Iran’s nuclear program must be considered an improper exaggeration.

 

Last update August 16, 2010.

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Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri has passed away yesterday at age 87. He died of a heart attack, or stroke, when sleeping in his bed at home. Hundred of thousands of mourners are right now gathering in Qom, where he is supposed to be entombed in Hazrat-e Masoumeh’s shrine, one of Iran’s holiest sites. His former rival, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, Iran‘s Supreme Leader, has described him as a “well-versed jurist and a prominent master,” very much belittling his role as one of the few real architects of the Islamic Revolution. The entire establishment is alert of mass protests these first ten days of the holy month of Muharram, climaxing next Monday, the day of Ashura, when Imam Husayn’s martyrdom in 680 CE is commemorated.

For many Iranians any hope for fundamental reforms is vanishing little by little. But the demise of Montazeri, the much revered Grand Ayatollah, a marja-e taqlid, or source of emulation, has not so much to do with the urgently needed modernization of the society. In the West, Montazeri appeared as castigator, even a reformist. The regime considered him, at least since 1989, a troublemaker. And in general, he has always been a backing of the regime, Iran’s Islamic Republic. However middle-term, Iran’s future does not lie in a theocracy, the only one if one considers the Vatican as an absurd anachronism.

When now late Ayatollah Khomeini’s companions and other Ayatollahs in Qom and throughout the country, and supporters in the present establishment die off, Iran’s main concern must be that eventually the Revolutionary Guards, or pasdaran, do take over all power. The presumed bitter power struggles in the aftermath of the, to say the least, controversial presidential election are not solved yet. Neither are the country’s tremendous economic and social problems. Not mentioning its more than ever pariah state within the international community. It was interesting to note that mainstream media hardly reported on President Ahmadinejad’s recent appearance at the Copenhagen climate conference. The illegitimate ruler is being ignored now, something what the hardliner and radical populist can hardly bear. Iran’s new proposal for a swap of its low-enriched uranium on Kish, a tiny island in the Persian Gulf, has been angrily rejected by the US administration.

The regime falters. It won’t simply implode. The next coup will be concocted by the pasdaran, I am afraid. Some believe they did it already.

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