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Posts Tagged ‘TRR’

Maybe a Breakthrough

Posted in IAEA, Iran, NPT, P5+1, USA, tagged , , , , , , , , , , on April 14, 2012 | Leave a Comment »

Talks in Istanbul today between delegates of the the UN Security Council member states plus Germany, and Iran over the latter’s disputed nuclear program are said to have been constructive. After weeks of mixed and highly confusing messages sent out by President Obama and his administration about either acceptance of Iran’s enrichment program in the event Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei would once again confirm that the country doesn’t seek nuclear weapons and unrealistic demands of closing down and dismantle the enrichment facility in Fordow and surrender any enriched uranium, be it at 3.5 or 20%, eventually the parties are now sitting at the same table.

Is this, as Obama claims, Iran’s last chance to solve the problem by diplomacy? Certainly not. We should recall the rather dexterous Iranian conduct of negotiations on 1 October 2009 in Geneva when chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili got quasi a green light from President Ahmadinejad for a swap deal which would mean that Iran would have sent out most of its lowly enriched uranium and receive in return fuel plates for its research reactor in Tehran (TRR). We all know that the deal did not receive formal approval by the Supreme Leader due to resistance of Ahmadinejad’s strong adversaries speaker of the parliament Ali Larijani and, well, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, the leader of the Green Movement. And in 2010, another attempt, outlined in the Iran-Turkey-Brazil deal called Tehran Declaration, failed (“too little, too late”) when Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton were more in favor of pushing for another round of sanctions.

Both sides urgently need success. Obama cannot afford an Israeli attack in his reelection year and neither can Iran. Thus, one might realistically expect that both sides seek a win-win outcome with reasonable compromises. To provide Iran with fuel plates for the TRR, to accept its enrichment to 3.5% on one side; to stop enriching to 20% and allow inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency better access to all nuclear facilities (i.e., eventually ratifying the Additional Protocol of the Non-proliferation Treaty and the modified code 3.1) on the other. Then sanction have to be lifted.

Last modified April 14, 2012.

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Enriched Particles

Posted in IAEA, Iran, NPT, tagged , , , , , , , on October 4, 2010 | Leave a Comment »

The harsher tone of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Yukiya Amano’s latest report on Iran’s nuclear activities, as compared to the more diplomatic phrasing of its direct predecessor Mohamed ElBaradei has led to a lot of warmongering among America’s neocons and the Israel Lobby. Main criticism has been directed to the mentioning of old allegations regarding military dimensions of the program; Iran’s withdrawal of designated IAEA inspectors due to leakage of confidential information to the media; controversially discussed obligations of implementing additional protocols of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and modified Code 3.1 which would have allowed early provision of design information of nuclear facilities such as the newly constructed and until mid 2009 covert uranium enrichment facility at Fordow near Qom; and finally Iran’s ongoing efforts of enriching uranium 235 to nearly 20% at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz, allegedly for eventually fueling the research reactor in Tehran (TRR) with higher enriched fuel plates or rods. The more than 40 years old TRR produces medical isotopes for diagnosis and treatment of, for instance, cancer.

The latter issue must be considered a contingency plan for Iran in case the fuel swap, which has been suggested in the so-called Tehran declaration of 17 May 2010 undersigned by Iran, Turkey and Brazil, would eventually fail.

One interesting piece of information in Amano’s report has not drawn much attention but was analyzed today by Joshua Pollack at ArmsControlWonk.com. The IAEA had detected particles enriched up to 7.1% uranium 235 in the vicinity of the ordinary Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz.

In paragraph 7 it is mentioned that,

“7. Since February 2007, the Agency (the IAEA) has taken a large number of environmental samples at FEP, the results of which have indicated a level of enrichment of uranium of less than 5.0% U-235. In one recent result, a small number of particles from samples taken in the cascade area were found with enrichment levels of between 5.0% and 7.1% U-235, i.e. higher than stated in the Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ). The Agency, in a letter dated 13 August 2010, informed Iran of this matter and requested clarification. In letters dated 17 August 2010 and 1 September 2010, Iran provided a possible explanation for the presence of such particles, along with supporting information. Iran’s explanation is not inconsistent with the Agency’s findings.”

In a footnote to this paragraph, it is detailed that,

“In this regard, it should be noted that Iran’s explanation refers to a known technical phenomenon associated with the start-up of centrifuge cascades.”

The “known technical phenomenon” is described by Pollack today.

“After some scratching around, what turns up is a paper by Houston Wood and Stephanos Tongelidis, ‘Gas Centrifuge Cascade Study for Maximum Assays During Start-Up.’ (Not online, sorry.) As the authors explain it, when UF6 gas is fed into a cascade during start-up, it’s done slowly at first, gradually ramping up to the ‘operational’ rate:

‘During start-up of the separation process using gas centrifuges, the concentration of 235U may rise above the desired production level before coming back down at steady state conditions. As uranium feed initially enters the facility, the flow rate will increase until it reaches the design flow rate. This transient condition will produce an enrichment ‘spike’ in the gas centrifuges.’”

Pollack finds it plausible that then few particles of enriched to 7.1% may be found.

“Wood and Tongelidis develop a model of a cascade meant to produce 3-6% U-235, develop a set of scenarios, and find that ‘expected peak enrichment levels due to the time transient [are] between 8-20% 235U.’ That makes small traces of 7.1% U-235 seem comprehensible, certainly.”

But Pollack remains skeptical:

“There are more sinister explanations as well. It’s at least possible that the operators have been deliberately experimenting with higher levels of enrichment here and there, perhaps to create ‘noise’ or find out what can or cannot be detected by inspectors. This seems unlikely, though: the Iranians are already enriching to nearly 20% at the adjacent PFEP facility, so what would be the point of mucking around beyond 5% at FEP?”

I do not share Pollack’s skepticism. I am afraid that not informing the public in Amano’s report about the details of the plausible explanations provided by the Iranians does not lead to more confidence or safety but more sanctions and threats of war. Somebody should teach the major diplomat, whose reports may in fact eventually lead to peace or war, some diplomacy.

Last modified October 4, 2010.

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Degrading Evidence

Posted in IAEA, Iran, NPT, USA, tagged , , , , , , , , on September 7, 2010 | Leave a Comment »

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Yukiya Amano’s new Iran report contains certain remarkable parts which might deserve some analysis.

To begin, there is nothing substantially new to report about Iran’s efforts to enrich uranium to low levels of 3 to 4% (LEU) at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) and to just below 20% at the Pilot FEP, both at Natanz; construction work at the second enrichment site in Fordow, which seems to have slowed down (most probably because the Iranians lost interest in the site after its existence had had been disclosed by President Obama at the G20 summit in Pittsburgh last September); the heavy water reactor in Arak; or the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. As of August 6, Iran has produced some 2,800 kg low enriched-uranium (LEU) at 3.5% and 22 kg LEU at just below 20%.

It is more interesting to read, in paragraph 35, that Amano had received a letter from Iran on 3 June 2010 stating that the designation of relevant inspectors of the IAEA will be withdrawn if confidential information acquired by the Agency as a result of implementing its Safeguard Agreement “leaks, in any way, and/or is conveyed to the media” (emphasis added). In another letter only one week later, Amano was informed that the designation of two inspectors, who had recently conducted inspections in Iran, has been objected, referring to the “false and wrong statements in paragraph 28” of Amano’s previous report. I had commented on that issue when having analyzed Amano’s last Iran report:

“In addition, in contrast to his predecessor, Amano does not seem to exercise due care in his report. He reports, for instance,

‘28. On 9 January 2010, during a DIV (Design Inventory Verification) at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory (JHL) in Tehran, the Agency was informed by the operator that pyroprocessing R&D activities had been initiated at JHL to study the electrochemical production of uranium metal. On 14 April 2010, the Agency conducted another DIV at the JHL, during which Iran reiterated what it had stated in its letter dated 21 February 2010, specifically that the activities were related to ‘a research project aiming purely [at] studying the electrochemical behavior or uranyl ion in ionic liquid,’ using a uranyl nitrate solution. During the latter DIV, the Agency observed that the electrochemical cell had been removed.’ Supposedly, these activities should be seen in relation to Iran’s efforts to produce fuel rods or plates for the TRR.

Doubt is spread here by Amano since metal uranium might be used for both military and civilian purposes. According to Soltanieh, ‘nothing has been removed. Whatever that is in the paragraph is wrong.’ According to Reuters, ‘an official with knowledge of the Iran investigation said the missing part was the ‘outer vessel’ of the equipment and that the main section had been left in place.’”

Withdrawals of Agency inspector designations have occurred also in the past. Amano insists that the reporting of the two recently barred inspectors was accurate. But why wasn’t it possible to simply check whether Soltanieh’s explanation regarding the observation made by the two inspectors was correct? The Agency also requested that Iran reconsiders “its decision of 16 January 2007 to request the Agency to withdraw the designation of 38 Agency inspectors and its requests (dating back to 2006) to withdraw the designations of four other inspectors with experience in conducting inspections in Iran.” David Sanger wrote yesterday in the New York Times, citing a European diplomat under the condition of anonymity: “Iran’s actions … are slowly blinding the agency and undermining its ability to conduct inspections with the kind of freedom it needs to dig beneath official denials and disavowals.” But how can Iran act in a different way if Amano wouldn’t even consider Soltanieh’s explanation?

Time and again, IAEA reports on Iran have demanded full implementation of the Additional Protocol as a confidence-building measure and the implementation of the modified Code 3.1 on the early provision of design information. In fact, if Iran’s leaders could agree to ratify what had been signed before, many problems with the country’s nuclear program could indeed be solved.

However, time and again American presidents have also confirmed that ‘all options were on the table,’ meaning military action aiming in the destruction of any nuclear facility; measures aiming in regime change, including the covert support of groups with a terroristic background; and, of course, ‘crippling’ sanctions. Israel deliberates military attacks, too. The public has been prepared well in recent years for another upcoming war in the Middle East.

Confidence building is overdue on both sides. Amano should take that into account when drafting his next reports on Iran.

 

Last update September 7, 2010.

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Yukiya Amano’s Second Iran Report

Posted in IAEA, Iran, NPT, tagged , , , , , , , , , on June 3, 2010 | 1 Comment »

Reactions in mainstream media were as usual after International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IADR) Director General Yukiya Amano’s second report on Iran had been leaked on Monday. According to some, Iran has now enough low-enriched uranium (LEU) to assemble two nuclear warheads within a couple of months.

But that is not the main message in the report. We know already that Iran won’t cease enriching uranium for its declared peaceful purposes at its Fuel Enrichment Plant near Natanz. So, given a slightly increased enrichment rate (from 117 to 120 kg per month), it is not surprising that Iran seems to possess now about 2400 kilograms LEU. We also know that, due to lack of confidence even after the successful negotiation of a fuel swap deal by Brazil, Turkey and Iran last month, further enrichment to 20%, which has been started in February, seems to go on. Tehran pretends that the country is capable of producing fuel for its research reactor in Tehran on its own. Many doubt, of course, that Iran would be able to manufacture the fuel rods or plates. But who would hold it against the country after a decades-long mutual distrust and the month-long charade about the TRR fuel which started with Ambassador Ali Ashgar Soltanieh’s letter to the IADR exactly one year ago.   

More significant is that Amano rather points to continuing lack of adequate implementation of Iran’s safeguard obligations. Also this is not news. That Iran does no longer implement the Additional Protocol which would, in particular, provide IAEA inspectors with greater rights of access to Iran’s nuclear facilities is a direct consequence of the IAEA’s referral of the issue to the UN Security Council in 2006. The same holds for the modified Code 3.1 as regards design information for, e.g., its IR-40 heavy water reactor under construction, which was suspended in March 2007 for similar reasons. It is interesting to note in that respect that, as one of his last acts as president, G. B. Bush had enforced the Additional Protocol for the U.S. on January 6, 2009, two weeks before Barack Obama moved to the White House.

But Amano suggests in his report that Iran consistently fails to address certain issues, which have been called, with reference to possible military dimension, the ‘alleged studies’ in previous reports (‘the laptop’, the ‘green salt project’). Iran has always claimed that information found on that respective laptop which has been smuggled out of the country in 2004, may be forged or fabricated and would not respond to allegations if not at least being provided with the original material. Amano’s predecessor Mohamed ElBaradei has constantly appealed, in his reports, to “Member States (i.e., the United States) which have provided documentation to the Agency would agree to share more of that documentation with Iran, as appropriate.” No word about this in Amano’s recent report.

In addition, in contrast to his predecessor, Amano does not seem to exercise due care in his report. He reports, for instance,

“28. On 9 January 2010, during a DIV (Design Inventory Verification) at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory (JHL) in Tehran, the Agency was informed by the operator that pyroprocessing R&D activities had been initiated at JHL to study the electrochemical production of uranium metal. On 14 April 2010, the Agency conducted another DIV at the JHL, during which Iran reiterated what it had stated in its letter dated 21 February 2010, specifically that the activities were related to “a research project aiming purely [at] studying the electrochemical behavior or uranyl ion in ionic liquid”, using a uranyl nitrate solution. During the latter DIV, the Agency observed that the electrochemical cell had been removed.” (Emphasis added.)

Supposedly, these activities might be seen in relation to Iran’s efforts to produce fuel rods or plates for the TRR.

Doubt is spread here by Amano since metal uranium might be used for both military and civilian purposes. According to Soltanieh, “nothing has been removed. Whatever that is in the paragraph is wrong.” According to Reuters, “an official with knowledge of the Iran investigation said the missing part was the “outer vessel” of the equipment and that the main section had been left in place.”

Soltanieh has submitted a letter of complaint to the IAEA today asking for amendments in the report. In that letter, he also notes that Amano’s report amazingly does not mention the successful negotiations of Brazil, Turkey and Iran for the swap deal and a conjoint declaration which has been sent to the IAEA in the meantime.

Last update June 3, 2010.

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Obama’s Letter to Lula

Posted in Brazil, IAEA, Iran, LEU, Turkey, tagged , , , , , , , on May 28, 2010 | Leave a Comment »

President Obama’s letter of April 20 to Brazilian’s President Lula da Silva has been leaked yesterday. Large parts deal with the proposal worked out by former nuclear watchdog Mohamed Elbaradei last October with regard to the fuel swap, Iran’s golden opportunity to get both fuel for its research reactor in Tehran (TRR) and sort of indirect legitimization of its ongoing enrichment efforts. Both sides would enormously benefit from mutual trust building.

The original text of ElBaradei’s proposal after the Geneva talks has not been made public yet, but it is known that it contained the proposition of sending 1,200 kg of Iran’s low-enriched uranium (LEU) to Russia while, after further enrichment, fuel rods or plates would be delivered later by France.

While the Iranian delegation found the implications of El Baradei’s proposal, i.e., legitimization of enrichment, very attractive, domestic power struggles finally led to a counterproposal: the swap had to take place on Iranian soil. That was unacceptable for the U.S. and other western powers since their main objective was to get about 75% of Iran’s stockpile of LEU out of country.

In November last year, in an attempt to overcome the impasse, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) offered Iran to ship 1,200 kg LEU to a third country, specifically Turkey. Obama notes, in his letter to Lula, that

“Iran has never pursued the ‘escrow’ compromise and has provided no credible explanation for its rejection. I believe that this raises real questions about Iran’s nuclear intentions, if Iran is unwilling to accept an offer to demonstrate that its LEU is for peaceful, civilian purposes. I would urge Brazil to impress upon Iran the opportunity presented by this offer to ‘escrow’ its uranium in Turkey while the nuclear fuel is being produced.” (Emphasis added.)

Well, that was exactly what Brazil and Turkey apparently did when they achieved their aim on May 17. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton now claims that the diplomatic breakthrough has been insufficient since Iran would not be willing to cease all enrichment efforts. As mentioned, we don’t know the exact wording of ElBaradei’s proposal. But Obama gives some hints:

“The IAEA’s proposal was crafted to be fair and balanced, and for both sides to gain trust and confidence. For us, Iran’s agreement to transfer 1,200 kg of Iran’s low enriched uranium (LEU) out of the country would build confidence and reduce regional tensions by substantially reducing Iran’s LEU stockpile. I want to underscore that this element is of fundamental importance for the United States. For Iran, it would receive the nuclear fuel requested to ensure continued operation of the TRR to produce needed medical isotopes and, by using its own material, Iran would begin to demonstrate peaceful nuclear intent. Notwithstanding Iran’s continuing defiance of five United Nations Security Council resolutions mandating that it cease its enrichment of uranium, we were prepared to support and facilitate action on a proposal that would provide Iran nuclear fuel using uranium enriched by Iran—a demonstration of our willingness to be creative in pursuing a way to build mutual confidence.”

I doubt whether the Iranian delegation would have even considered the deal if it had contained an element of ceasing uranium enrichment. Thus, at least indirectly, the U.S. would have tolerated Iran’s enrichment efforts, something which is now, after the deal had unexpectedly been brokered by Turkey and Brazil, is denied in order to impose new sanctions.

 

Last update May 28, 2010.

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