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Posts Tagged ‘Yukiya Amano’

Now as roofing two buildings at the Parchin military complex east of Tehran has nearly been completed, we get another chance of having a look from space thanks to David Albright’s Washington think tank ISIS who has kept us up to date. A lot has been achieved there since April when satellite pictures had indicated what resembled a vigorous spring cleaning using even quite a lot of water. After having removed now glaring pink tarps, the new roofs appear pleasantly blue. The area around the two buildings has been leveled and even some gardening seems to have taken place with piles of (garden?) mold neatly assembled probably for further beautification.

The problem is that one of the buildings has been identified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), indicated by its Director General Yukiya Amano in his November 2011 report, as having been constructed for illicit experiments with high-explosives in the early 2000s,

“49. Other information [...] provided by Member States indicates that Iran constructed a large explosives containment vessel in which to conduct hydrodynamic experiments. The explosives vessel, or chamber, is said to have been put in place at Parchin in 2000. A building was constructed at that time around a large cylindrical object at a location at the Parchin military complex. A large earth berm was subsequently constructed between the building containing the cylinder and a neighbouring building, indicating the probable use of high explosives in the chamber. The Agency has obtained commercial satellite images that are consistent with this information.”

Probably the same member state(s) which leaked the rather ridiculous graph the other day to Associated Press’ George Jahn which is supposed to prove Iran’s interest in computer simulations of nuclear test and which has been debunked by so many people in the meantime that I find it hard to write something halfway intelligent about it.

Parchin_4 (28-7-11)

Well, when having visited Parchin in 2005 twice, IAEA inspectors were not able to locate these rather peripheral two buildings (encircled at the top of the picture) inside this huge complex. Iran has not granted again access, which has been requested by the IAEA since Amano’s report, while work went on and ISIS reported regularly, not noticing that its founder and president David Albright made himself a laughing stock when asking IAEA’s DG and the Board of Governors the urgent question, “what should now be done about Iran’s continued refusal of a legitimate request for access combined with its alterations of the site?”

Indeed, what should be done? Does IAEA has a mandate to visit the site? Well, there seem to be different opinions about that. Would it help if Iran would provide access? If one actually assumes what Albright and others fear, what are the consequences of a visit? Supposed they have actually been conducted in the early 2000s (and, according to the 2007 NIE, abandoned in 2003), IAEA inspectors certainly would still find evidence for illicit experiments with high-explosives. Nuclear experiments cannot be undone just by cleaning buildings and removing and replacing soil. Even if they won’t find anything, with all these heavy construction work at the site in recent months Iran would not become a credible and responsible player overnight.

So, consequences are dire anyway. Unilateral sanctions, which are underway, will be a precursor for new UN sanctions and Iran’s pariah status cemented. And presidential elections are upcoming. Maybe both officials in the U.S. and Iran consider Nowruz as being a delightful occasion to officially show IAEA inspectors and the world the now tidied-up tool sheds. Until then, we have to wait for new satellite images provided by David Albright.

1 December 2012 @ 10:55 am

Last modified December 1, 2012.

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It has widely been reported that the head of Iran’s ‘s Atomic Energy Agency  Fereydoon Abbasi-Davani had, in an interview with the Arabian newspaper Al-Hayat the other day,  admitted that Iran had occasionally misinformed inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about its nuclear program because of foreign espionage.

Apparently as far as I can see he did not mention the IAEA, rather MI6, although one can be sure that Iran has been playing chess with IAEA’s Yukiya Amano and his predecessor Mohamed ElBaradei for a long time. But it makes certainly a difference what Abbasi-Davani had actually said and what is being spread through the media in times of mounting tensions about Iran’s nuclear program. “We sometimes [gave] false information in order to protect our nuclear sites and our earnings, as inevitably mislead foreign intelligence”. He predicts that “the [Iran's] file” will be referred again to the UN Security Council by Amano in November.

So, I was probably right when interpreting the recent covering of a suspect building at the Parchin military complex, which might contain or have contained a high explosive test chamber, with a flashy pink tarp which is highly visible from space as an attempt to mislead and mock both the IAEA and those who seem to be obsessed with these kinds of satellite images.

But both sides misinform. Respective David Albright, president and founder of Washington DC-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), who has been beating the drums about Parchin for almost eight years now, has a strange view of what Iran is allowed under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and what not. In his complaint about NAM (Non-aligned Movement) countries’ “hypocritical” statement on Iran’s nuclear program and the Tehran Declaration he claims that, under Article IV of the NPT, “Iran cannot claim the right to nuclear energy production – or a right to enrich at all – while under investigation for possible non-peaceful uses of these capabilities.” Not just hilarious but uninformed and misleading, as Dan Joyner of the Alabama School of Law rightfully debunks.

September 22, 2012 @ 09:16

Last update September 22, 2012.

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Update below.

Yukiya Amano, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has written another dangerous report on Iran’s  nuclear program. Again, the important news is that there is nothing new. His language becomes shrill, though. Non-diversion of “declared” nuclear material at the “declared” nuclear facilities and “locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used” is verified as before. But he seems to express doubt that Iran declares everything it is obliged to declare under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. The Fordow site near Qom has seen a doubling in (mainly not yet fed or spinning) centrifuges since his last report on Iran on May 25,  now they approximate 3000. But this time Amano also points, with increasing frustration and dismay, at the Parchin military site which had been mentioned in his November 2011 report as a site where Iran had possibly conducted illicit nuclear experiments with high explosives almost ten years ago and  which IAEA inspectors have not got permission by Iranian authorities, despite numerous requests, to visit yet. As seen on recent satellite images this site has been the subject of dramatic (de-)construction work since then. Amano stresses that, in stark contrast, nothing had changed in several years after the site (Parchin, but apparently different buildings of the huge complex) had been visited by the IAEA last time in 2005.

As an independently and cautiously acting nuclear watchdog, Amano has been a flop so far. Just a compliant US lackey. A diplomatic cable published by WikiLeaks has actually proved that some time ago. Whether Israel is really preparing for an attack before the US American election in November is still not certain. Dogs which bark, don’t bite. As a matter of fact Iran has been threatened with war at this time of the year for many years.

The best solution would be if Iran could finally grant access to the Parchin site and either prove nothing had happened at and in the suspect building or declare that illicit experiments there had been stopped after 2003.

An excellent rebuttal of Amano’s latest report can be found here.

August 31, 2012 @ 08:15

Last modified August 31, 2012.

Update. Once again, Moon of Alamaba discovered a significant detail in the two Amano reports on Iran, of May 25 and yesterday. One has to carefully read and calculate to understand that Iran has in fact reduced the amount of up to 20% enriched uranium-235 in the gaseous form UF6 (which can be further enriched to weapon-grade, 90% enriched, uranium)  from 101 kg (in the May 25 report) to 91.4 kg (in the report yesterday). Apparently Iran is now producing urgently needed (for medical purposes) fuel plates of UO2 for the Tehran Research Reactor which cannot be used for further enrichment, a confidence-building measure, so to say. It proves Amano’s dishonesty that he does not mention, let alone acknowledge, simple calculations but rather conceals them in numerous paragraphs and figures in the report.

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Two demolished smaller buildings at the suspect site and huge amounts of earth which had apparently been (re)moved in the vicinity certainly won’t contribute to urgently desired confidence building that Iran is not doing illicit experiments at the Parchin military complex some 30 km east of Tehran. While an April 9 satellite picture apparently showing water running from the building has led to humorous speculations by some over possible spring cleaning (rather than raised eyebrows) the new image of May 25, just after IAEA’s Yukiya Amano had returned to Vienna after discussions in Tehran about IAEA inspectors being finally allowed to visit Parchin need in fact explanation by Iran.

Last modified June 1, 2012.

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Apart from now common and frequent reference to Iran being in contrary to UN Security Council resolutions, the latest Iran report of UN nuclear watchdog Yukiya Amano does not state anything new except that environmental samples taken at the Fordow uranium enrichment site have revealed a level of enriched uranium above what has Iran has declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 27%.

“28. The results of analysis of environmental samples taken at FFEP (Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant on 15 February 2012 showed presence of particles with enrichment levels of up to 27% U-235, which are higher than the level stated in the DIQ (Design Information Questionnaire). In a letter dated 4 May 2012, the Agency (IAEA) requested that Iran provide an explanation for the presence of these particles. In its reply, dated 9 May 2012, Iran indicated that the production of such particles “above the target value” may happen for technical reasons beyond the operator’s control. The Agency is assessing Iran’s explanation and has requested further details. On 5 May 2012, the Agency took further environmental samples from the same location where the particles in question had been found. These samples are currently being analysed.”

David Albright, president of the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), has an explanation and both dampens and fuels the immediate brouhaha in mainstream media.

“The IAEA has found traces of uranium enriched up to 27 percent at Iran’s Fordow enrichment plant. This elevation is likely due to improved cascade design. An effect is to overshoot 20 percent when 3.5 percent LEU (low enriched uranium) is fed into the tandem cascades at the old feed rate for 15 stage cascades. To avoid this problem, Iran likely increased the feed rate of 3.5 percent LEU, which lowered the enrichment level of the product back to 19.75 percent. It also increased slightly the amount of 19.75 percent produced.

This development is an embarrassment for Iran but it is not a sign of Iran moving to higher enrichment levels. Nonetheless, its deployment of a 17-stage cascade reflects a reconfiguration of the cascades that can make breakout faster and more efficient.” (Emphasis added.)

Well, 19.75% is a construct anyway. It is conventionally LEU while 20+ percent would be highly enriched uranium (which automatically would lead to brouhaha).  That the Iranians are embarrassed is rather not likely. That IAEA inspectors were able to detect these “particles” indicates just two things: That Iran can quickly enrich to higher levels if a respective decision was made and that the IAEA can easily monitor this (provided Iran has made them aware of each of its enrichment facilities; Amano again complains that Iran has specified, in 2010, the locations of ten further sites without providing the IAEA with respective information yet).

 

Last modified May 26, 2012.

 

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