A Network of Covert Uranium Enrichment Plants

Today’s announcement by Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of the now rapid construction of a further ten uranium enrichment plants with up to 500’000 centrifuges (the locations of five had been decided already) definitely proves that Iran is seeking a network of enrichment plants which has been hidden to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) so far and which completely contradicts claims that the Fordow site near Qom was the only site besides that at Natanz.

Despite new activities at its uranium mines, Iran’s many problems include, however, lack of uranium for enrichment. Since the proposed deal of outgoing IAEA Director General ElBaradei of swapping Iran’s low-enriched uranium (less than 4%) with some 20% enriched fuel from Russia and France for producing its urgently needed medical isotopes in its research reactor in Tehran seems to be dead, Iran may even see salvation in leaving the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, which would be a true disaster.

See a technical analysis of the Fordow enrichment plant here.

This entry was posted in IAEA, Iran, NPT and tagged , , , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

2 Responses to A Network of Covert Uranium Enrichment Plants

  1. Fahad says:

    See a critique of the above technical analysis of Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

  2. Pingback: How Does an Enrichment Facility Look From Space? « Freelance

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